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Fidelity, Conscience, and Dissent: Engaging the LCWR and Charles Curran on the Issue of
Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context
This thesis critically examines the cases of Vatican intervention with the Leadership
Conference for Women Religious (LCWR) and Charles Curran to explore the question of
whether legitimate dissent is possible as an act of conscience. The Doctrinal Assessment of the
Leadership Conference for Women Religious released by the Congregation for the Doctrine of
Faith, as well as the exchange between Sr. Pat Farrell, then-president of the LCWR, and Bishop
Blair, the one who conducted the investigation on the LCWR, on “Fresh Air,” a radio show on
National Public Radio raise questions about how the Church is to understand truth, obedience,
and conscience. This event also raises questions about why this controversy occurs at this point
in history.
To critically examine the differing perspectives of dissent and conscience, I analyze the
case of Charles Curran, a Catholic priest and former professor at Catholic University of America,
to exlore how dissent might be understood to be an act of a holistic conscience – one that takes
seriously the subjective/ affective elements of human experience as well as the objective pole of
morality. By applying the insights of the Curran case analogously to the LCWR case, with the
help of Robert K. Vischer’s articulation of the relational dimension of conscience, this thesis
articulates how the Church might understand its role in being a venue for consciences to thrive
while preserving its claim of authentic teaching authority.
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Introduction
On April 16, 2012, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) released their
Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious in which it reported
the findings of the CDF-initiated doctrinal assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women
Religious (LCWR) that began in 2008. In this assessment, the CDF posits three major areas of
concern: 1) “Addresses given during LCWR annual Assemblies manifest problematic statements
and serious theological, even doctrinal errors,” 2) “policies of corporate dissent,” and 3) “a
prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic faith.” 1 As a result,
the CDF has mandated a series of reviews and reforms under the guidance of Archbishop J. Peter
Sartain and his assistants, Bishop Thomas Paprocki and Bishop Leonard Blair, in the hope of “a
renewal of [the LCWR’s] work through a concentrated reflection on the doctrinal foundations of
that work.” 2 Since then the LCWR has attempted to dialogue with the Vatican leadership and the
appointed delegates while refusing to accept the reforms mandated thus far by the CDF’s
doctrinal assessment.
While these events have occurred relatively recently and may even be argued to be of an
unprecedented scale, the basic themes that rest at the foundation of these events are by no means
novel. These events throw into relief foundational questions of fidelity, dissent and conscience in
the Roman Catholic Church. What is fidelity? Is dissent a morally authentic form of prophetic
witness? Is dissent even possible? What authority does the Magisterium carry in exercising to
moral truths? What role does conscience play in fidelity and/ or dissent? It is my hope that by
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“Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious.” Congregation for
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analyzing the current events involving the LCWR in light of recent developments in the realm of
moral theology, specifically the case of Charles Curran, I might provide new insights into 1) why
dissent is a moral issue and not just a matter of ecclesial authority and 2) when dissent functions
as not just a morally viable option but also a faithful act of good conscience. I approach these
questions by applying the insights from the Curran case towards the LCWR’s response to the
Vatican. These questions, while not new, are important to be asked in every generation as
tradition in every age struggles to come to terms with the reality in which it lives. I argue that
taking seriously the implications of modernity’s turn to the subject requires the Church and the
faithful to acknowledge the possibility of dissent as a moral act of conscience. This
acknowledgement, in turn, calls for an open dialogue on the way which objective truths and
subjectivity coincide within the human person’s life narrative.
Voices to be Considered – Curran and Sr. Pat Farrell
The primary voices around which this thesis is centered are those of Charles Curran and
Sr. Pat Farrell, OSF, the president of the LCWR. Through these two figures, I engage the
question of conscience in the hope of moving beyond an over-simplification of such cases that
reduces the complexity of conscience-based tensions into a contest with only one winner and one
loser. By analogously applying the thoughts of Robert K. Vischer on the relational dimension of
conscience, I hope to move beyond a simplistic dichotomy and think critically about conscience
as being at the center of a moral relationship between the two. 3 Lastly, Sr. Pat Farrell’s
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Vischer, Robert. Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person
and State. (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010).
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presidential address to the LCWR during their annual assembly on August 10, 2012 will provide
a moral framework through which the insights of Charles Curran can be applied today. 4
Charles Curran is a central figure because his narrative is a similar and relatively current
case of dissent in the Church today. Curran had been deemed ineligible to be a professor of
Catholic theology by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1986, headed at the time
by Cardinal Josef Ratzinger (now Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI). This culminated after years of
clashing with church authorities over issues like contraception, homosexuality, divorce, abortion,
and the Church hierarchy’s role in moral matters. As such, Curran has distinguished himself as
one of the most prominent and controversial Roman Catholic moral theologians in the United
States. What is most intriguing about his story is that despite the actions taken against him,
Curran remains a committed Catholic priest who continues to work for authentic reform in the
same Church that censured him. His narrative, and not so much the substance of his dissent on
the various moral issues, will be one of the primary foci of this thesis as it provides insight into
the moral possibilities of dissent itself.
Sr. Pat Farrell, OSF, is the former-president of the LCWR who delivered her last address
to the LCWR at their annual assembly in August of 2012. In her address, titled “Navigating the
Shifts,” she directly responds to the CDF’s doctrinal assessment of the LCWR and lays out a
general framework for the organization’s actions moving forward. The tenets of her speech
provides a framework for a contemporary moral understanding of dissent as dialogue and
prophetic witness.

4
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Method
While a historical approach to the development of moral theology might provide a deeper
understanding of the depth with which dissent has marked and shaped the Church 5, I also use the
case of Charles Curran’s clash with the Vatican in order to provide a theological analysis on the
ethics of dissent so as to shed light on the LCWR’s current situation. By identifying common
themes between both the LCWR and the Curran cases, I argue that a contemporary
understanding of conscience requires the acknowledgment of the moral legitimacy of dissent as a
dialogical praxis.
The first question to be considered is how one might move beyond the usual discussions
of conscience without slipping into the oversimplified dualism of Church hierarchy versus the
consciences of the faithful (i.e. reducing conscience to authority). While the two elements do
need to be seriously considered, it is possible to negotiate the tension between the two without
vilifying one or the other. A rethinking of conscience by reflecting on its relational dimension
provides new fertile ground for fruitful discussion on the role of the Magisterium and the
consciences of the faithful in terms of relationality and mutual accountability. This is an attempt
to move the discussion away from simply an ecclesiological question which lends itself to
hierarchical functionality and authority towards an ethical discussion of right relationship with an
anthropological starting point that might transform the ecclesial makeup of a contemporary
Church. While the question of hierarchical authority will be engaged, this thesis will not be a full
systematic analysis of ecclesial authority as the primary focus is on dissent as an act of holistic
conscience.

5

Charles Curran’s book, Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History, traces the development of moral
theology in the United States in the past two centuries. This includes a various array of interconnected subjects such
as the Second Vatican Council and its effects on fundamental moral theology, bioethics, sexual ethics, and social
ethics in the United States.
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Secondly, one must consider the connotations of the terms “fidelity” and “dissent” so as
to move past the polarizing connotations they carry. While “fidelity” is traditionally understood
to mean loyalty to the orthodoxy of the faith tradition, “dissent” is traditionally understood to
mean the public and scandalous turning away from the orthodoxy of faith tradition. However,
once the questions are asked – To whom or what is one’s fidelity towards? To whom or what is
one dissenting against? – then the terms come to find more nuanced meanings and the
complexities of dissent and fidelity are unpacked. Ultimately, these terms can grow and develop
to be more similar than they are different. By reflecting on these terms in the context of a holistic
conscience, fidelity and dissent are not competing attributes but could act as catalysts for
rethinking how one engages in a moral relationship with the Magisterium.
The last question to be considered is how this ethical framework for dissent might play
out in reality. An analogical analysis of Charles Curran’s case with the LCWR’s case may very
well provide insight into how, as Sr. Pat Farrell put it, the LCWR can “navigate the shifts”
moving forward. While there will not be a perfect symmetry between Curran’s dissent and the
LCWR’s clash with the Vatican (i.e.- corporate versus individual dissent), their common themes
indicate the importance of conscience and its relationship with authority on the discernment of
truth in a post-Vatican II world.
Navigating a New Way Forward
Through carefully discerning these questions, this thesis does not hope to encapsulate all
the answers possible but rather seeks to open new avenues for discussion on the ethical
implication of dissent in the Church. Both the LCWR and Curran cases illustrate how instances
of controversy over dissent in the Church are not problems to be solved but are opportunities for
dialogue on moral issues that contain potential for new insights for the Church. In the narrowest
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sense, I seek to provide a renewed sense of hope in support of the LCWR as well as a renewed
sense of fidelity to the Roman Catholic Church as it continually negotiates its place in a
pluralistic moral landscape. By reframing the discussion of conscience not in the terms of static
and individualized functionality, but rather as a relationally binding and complex element of selftranscendence of the human person, dissent might be understood as fidelity to good conscience.
Thus, the actions of the LCWR and Charles Curran can be understood as exercises of their
consciences in the hopes of charitable dialogue with the bishops.
Understanding that this thesis may very well have a modest effect, if at all, on the current
situation regarding the LCWR, it is my deepest intention that this inquiry into the moral
dimension of dissent provides yet another perspective on this difficult question. By starting with
an empirical and anthropological perspective, as much of contemporary theology has already
done, it would be significant to reflect on how the Magisterium might respond more fully with
the same starting point in this new century. For the Church to meaningfully address
contemporary moral matters it must address the current existence of a pluralism of consciences.
In this regard, an anthropological starting point that gives weight to human experiences while
addressing questions of fidelity and dissent might be a gateway for new possibilities for a new
millennium. It is my hope to contribute to this theological endeavor in light of current events and
in service of the common good of the people of God.
The Road Map
Moving forward this thesis addresses the relational approach to conscience, fidelity and
dissent as dialogue, and an ethic of dissent incrementally.
Chapter one, “A Zero-Sum Game? - The LCWR and the Vatican,” addresses the
movement beyond vilifying either the Magisterium or the dissenters by throwing into relief the

6

deeper questions that arise out of the LCWR case. Much of this controversy has played out in the
media, and I will analyze two interviews done on National Public Radio (NPR) with Sr. Pat
Farrell and Bishop Blair to draw out the perspectives from which the LCWR and the Vatican
draw their conclusions.
Chapter two, “Curran, Dissent, and the Holistic Conscience” examines the Curran
controversy to draw renewed insight into the LCWR case for the third chapter. This chapter not
only focuses on how Curran came to be in conflict with the Vatican, but I also draw upon
Curran’s conception of a holistic conscience where the subjective and the objective meet in the
human person. Curran’s approach to conscience is important to understand the framework with
which Curran justifies his dissent yet still considers himself a faithful Catholic.
Chapter three, “Responsible Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context,” applies the insights
from chapters one and two in an analysis of Sr. Pat Farrell’s address to the LCWR and their
actions since. By articulating the context in which dissent creates a charitable – but not
necessarily painless – dialogue in good conscience between the Magisterium and the faithful, I
introduce Vischer’s articulation of a relational conscience as the key to understanding a practical
framework for responsible dissent. By taking seriously the implications of modernity’s turn to
the subject, Vischer’s approach to conscience as an act of a person’s life narrative implicates the
Church with the responsibility to dialogue with dissenters with a hermeneutic of charity and not
suspicion.
In the conclusion, I note that while this is not a systematic analysis on a new theory of
conscience, it is a foundation for understanding the role of dissent in a Roman Catholic context
as an act of conscience. In the service of the common good, the Church and the People of God
have the responsibility towards each other to dialogue with openness and charity over the

7

conscientious issues that affect the heart of who human persons are and what the Church as the
People of God is.

8

Chapter One: A Zero-Sum Game? - The LCWR and the Vatican
Much of the LCWR controversy has taken place through the media and its various
outlets. Before theological reflection on the controversy can begin, a contextual understanding of
the way in which the LCWR controversy is presented to the public provides, in itself, a good
starting point for inquiry. A critical understanding how each interested party, the LCWR and the
Vatican, arrived at their particular views provides a unique insight into the possibility of a new
moral understanding of dissent and an opportunity for a new ecclesial framework. While it might
be profitable for the media and intriguing for public scrutiny, a zero-sum game approach to the
LCWR controversy wherein either the LCWR or the Vatican must “lose” in order for the other to
“win” does not contribute to the mission and Spirit of the Church. However, when one
understands the different starting points from which the LCWR and the Vatican perceive,
interpret, and act upon the present controversy, then an opportunity for moral dialogue and
ecclesial maturity presents itself in the life of the Church raising questions about theology and
public debate.
Sr. Pat Farrell’s Response to the Vatican’s Assessment
As stated in the introduction, the CDF indicated three major areas of concern of what it
perceives to be indicative of the LCWR’s erroneous ways in need of guidance and reform: 1)
theological and doctrinal errors within LCWR’s annual assemblies, 2) policies of corporate
dissent, and 3) “a prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic
faith.” 6 Examining Sr. Pat Farrell’s responses to the CDF’s charges provides insight into the
LCWR’s point of departure with the Vatican.

6

“Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious.” Congregation for
the Doctrine of Faith (CDF), April 16, 2012, II - The Doctrinal Assessment.
9

Addresses given during annual LCWR general assemblies
Regarding the annual addresses given at LCWR general assemblies, the doctrinal
assessment cites Bishop Leonard Blair’s example of an instance where Sr. Laurie Brink spoke of
“some Religious ‘moving beyond the Church’ or even beyond Jesus.’” 7 The CDF interprets this
as:
[a] challenge not only to core Catholic beliefs; such a rejection of faith is also a serious
source of scandal and is incompatible with religious life […] Some might see in Sr.
Brink’s analysis a phenomenological snapshot of religious life today. But Pastors of the
Church should also see in it a cry for help.8

By using language such as “challenge”, “rejection of faith”, “serious source of scandal”, and
“cry for help”, the CDF’s Doctrinal Assessment seems to frame the LCWR’s actions as moving
from challenge to rejection and ultimately distress.
It is important to note that in Sr. Pat Farrell’s interview with Terry Gross on “Fresh Air,”
a program broadcast on National Public Radio, she articulates the situation very differently. In
regard to the specific quote of Sr. Laurie Brink, Farrell states:
it’s quoted very much out of context from the presentation that was given, and in the
context the person giving that was talking about how do we deal with conflicts within the
church, with differences that we have with hierarchy. […] And so she outlined several
scenarios of possible ways to respond. And one of them was, well, we could move
beyond Jesus, we could move beyond the church.

However, Farrell also went on to note that Sr. Laurie Brink’s “preferred approach would be that
we continually seek dialogue and reconciliation with the hierarchy.” 9
Just by looking at the first point of concern one can already spot the differing
perspectives of the LCWR and the Vatican are viewing the present situation. The Vatican
7

Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal
Assessment.
8
Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal
Assessment.
9
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Gross. NPR, July 17, 2012. Web.
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appears to be viewing the LCWR with a hermeneutic of suspicion while the LCWR feels that it
is merely providing an analysis of a present reality while still being faithful its core doctrines.
Policies of Corporate Dissent
The Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious states:
Leadership Teams of various Congregations, among them LCWR Officers, protesting the
Vatican’s actions regarding the question of women’s ordination and of a correct pastoral
approach to ministry to homosexual persons (e.g., letters about New Ways Ministry’s
conferences). The terms of the letters suggest that these sisters collectively take a position
not in agreement with the Church’s teaching on human sexuality. It is a serious matter
when these Leadership Teams are not providing effective leadership and example to their
communities, but place themselves outside the Church’s teaching. 10

In response to this allegation, Sr. Pat Farrell claims that an important distinction to make is that
“individual congregations or leadership teams may have taken certain positions; the Leadership
Conference of Women Religious has not.” 11 Farrell distances the possible culpability of the
LCWR from the letters being referred to because those letters come from “Leadership Teams”
and not on behalf of the LCWR as an institution. For Farrell, the actions of the Leadership
Teams – protesting the Vatican – do not speak to the integrity, intent, or actions taken by the
LCWR. At best, the CDF assessment was able only to link the two by interpreting the letters as
mere suggestion about “these sisters” (not necessarily the whole body of the LCWR as it remains
vague as to what the CDF means be “these sisters”), that they collectively take a position
opposite the Church. 12
Despite distancing the LCWR from possible culpability, Farrell goes on to state:
[The LCWR has] been, in good faith, raising concerns about some of the church’s
teaching on sexuality, human sexuality, the problem being that the teaching and
interpretation of the faith can’t remain static and really needs to be reformulated,
10

Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal
Assessment.
11
Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.”
12
Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal
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rethought, in the light of the world we live in and new questions, new realities as they
arise. And if those issues become points of conflict, it’s because women religious stand in
very close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult
situations in their lives. That is our gift to the church. 13

Again, Farrell defends the LCWR’s positions as being that of an inquiry and moral conviction
shared by many in the Church. This inquiry and moral conviction is rooted in the reality that
“people at the margins” live in and need a presentation of faith that is “less black and white
because human realities are much less black and white.” 14 In this way, Sr. Pat Farrell is calling
for an understanding of living tradition that the Vatican has yet to embrace.
Radical Feminism
The last area of concern in the doctrinal assessment is
[the] prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic faith in
some of the programs and presentations sponsored by the LCWR, including theological
interpretations that risk distorting faith in Jesus and his loving Father who sent his Son
for the salvation of the world. Moreover, some commentaries on “patriarchy” distort the
way in which Jesus has structured sacramental life in the Church; others even undermine
the revealed doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and the inspiration of
Sacred Scripture. 15

Related, but not necessarily explicitly linked, to this Doctrinal Assessment of the LCWR are two
instances of hierarchical intervention involving two feminist theologians in the United States: Sr.
Elizabeth Johnson, C.S.J. and Sr. Margaret Farley, R.S.M. In March of 2011, Sr. Elizabeth
Johnson, C.S.J. had her book, Quest for the Living God, critiqued by the Committee on Doctrine
by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops for not being in “accord with authentic
Catholic teaching on essential points” 16 as a result of her feminist method. In June, after the CDF
Doctrinal Assessment of the LCWR was released, the CDF also released a statement that
13
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denounced the book, Just Love, by Sr. Margaret Farley, R.S.M., for not being in accord with
Catholic teaching as well.
In response to this criticism of the LCWR, Farrell gives her own observation that there is
a “fear of women’s position in the church.” 17 She claims that what the CDF is referring to as
“radical feminism” is really an authentic attempt by Catholic women theologians to look
seriously look at “the question of how have the church’s interpretations of how we talk about
God, about how we interpret Scripture, about how we organize or life in the church, how have
those formulations been tainted by a culture, a religious culture, a secular culture, that minimizes
the value and the place of women?” 18 For the CDF to call that “radical feminism” is, according
to Farrell, “a polarizing way of talking about it, which sounds a little fear-based.” 19 Again, there
exists a present tension between a grassroots approach that starts from personal experience and a
top-down approach to doctrinal matters. This tension is a symptom of deeper theological
differences that reflect the plurality of intra-institutional theologies within the Roman Catholic
Church. These differences are manifest in the differing approaches to moral questions of
decisionality as it relates to the moral agent’s individual personhood in relationship to the world
around him or her. In the LCWR’s instance, the sisters seem to be concerned with re-articulating
women’s place in the present world in light of developing feminist theologies. Meanwhile, the
CDF is concerned with the possibility of the LCWR communicating what the CDF deems to be
erroneous theology, despite the good intentions of the LCWR’s pastoral approaches, as women
religious in the Roman Catholic Church.

17
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Bishop Blair’s Response and the Vatican’s Point of Departure
A week after Sr. Pat Farrell shared her thoughts about the LCWR controversy on “Fresh
Air,” Bishop Leonard Blair – the one who was conducted the doctrinal assessment of the LCWR
– was the guest on Terry Gross’ show and shared his perspective on the matter. It is clear the
Bishop Blair’s understanding of the controversy is a manifestation of the Vatican’s position on
three major questions: 1) What is truth? 2) What is obedience? And 3) What is their relationship
in a human persons moral agency? This comes to light when Blair responds to Gross when asked
about whether or not the assessment really indicated a spirit of conformity rather than dialogue.
Bishop Blair responded by saying:
we have to give a nuance about dialogue because if by dialogue they mean that the
doctrines of the church are negotiable, and that the bishops represent one position and the
LCWR presents another position, and somehow we find a middle ground about basic
church teaching on faith and morals, then no. […] the fundamental faith of the Catholic
Church is that there are objective truths; and there are teachings of the faith that really do
come from revelation, and that are interpreted authentically through the teaching office of
the church, by the guidance of the Holy Spirit; and that are expected to be believed with
the obedience of faith. And those things are not negotiable.20

In this statement, Bishop Blair communicates clearly how he understands truth and obedience.
What is Truth?
When Bishop Blair speaks of “objective truths” and “revelation” he indicates a deep
tradition of Roman Catholic thinking found in various Church documents. For instance, in
Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II asserts:
“within Tradition, the authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law develops, with the help
of the Holy Spirit. […] Nevertheless, it can only confirm the permanent validity of
Revelation and follow in the line of the interpretation given to it by the great tradition of
the Church’s teaching and life, as witness by the teaching of the Fathers, the lives of the
Saints, the Church’s Liturgy and the teaching of the Magisterium.” 21

20

Blair, Leonard. Farrell, “Bishop Explains Vatican’s Criticism of U.S. Nuns.” Fresh Air.
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Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II. (1993), 27.
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By building upon the Second Vatican Council’s works, Pope John Paul II admits that the “Lord’s
law develops” as human history advances and new realities come to light. However, the way in
which the Lord’s law develops is of importance. By preserving the line of interpretation to the
Church’s teaching, the witness of the Fathers, the lives of the Saints, the Church’s liturgy and the
teaching of the Magisterium, Pope John Paul II makes exclusive the role of developing the
interpretation of the Lord’s Law to the Magisterium – the teaching office of the Roman Curia
and the bishops.
This understanding of how the Lord’s law develops would even address the way in which
the Vatican finds “radical feminism” troubling and incompatible with the Roman Catholic faith
because it understands itself to be the sole valid and authentic interpreters of the Lord’s law. In
regards to the role of theologians, Cardinal Josef Ratzinger states:
This service to the ecclesial community brings the theologian and the Magisterium into a
reciprocal relationship. […] Theology, for its part, gains, by way of reflection, an ever
deeper understanding of the Word of God found in the Scripture and handed on faithfully
by the Church's living Tradition under the guidance of the Magisterium. Theology strives
to clarify the teaching of Revelation with regard to reason and gives it finally an organic
and systematic form. 22

Thus, the Vatican takes the stance that even the overwhelming series of new theological
movements (e.g. – feminist theology, liberation theology, historical-critical methodology, etc.)
based upon the ever-changing realities of the faithful are subject to the interpretation of the
Magisterium for authenticity. Given the Vatican’s tradition of understanding the domain of truth
as a received gift given to the Church by Jesus Christ, Blair considers these truths to be “nonnegotiable.”
What is obedience?
In her interview, Sr. Pat Farrell states her understanding of obedience:
22

Donum Veritatis: On the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian. Congregation of the Doctrine
of Faith. (May 24, 1990), 21.
15

[listening] to what God is calling us to in the signs of our times. We listen to the voice of
God in legitimate church authority, in the pain and the hopes and the aspirations of the
people of our time. We listen to the voice of God in the depths of our own hearts, and in
our consciences; and that all of that together is what we listen to in trying to discern, what
is God really calling me to? And it’s to that, that I must be obedient.23

This obedience that Sr. Pat Farrell speaks of could be understood to mean obedience to one’s
own conscience while also listening to “legitimate church authority.” This inclusive vision of
obedience does not necessarily disregard or openly reject the Vatican’s authority to teach
doctrine. Instead, her vision is inclusive of the imminent and personal voice of God that speaks
to people in their consciences. However, Bishop Blair understands obedience much more
narrowly.
In response to Sr. Pat’s definition of obedience, Blair states:
it sounds very beautiful and appealing. And no one can argue that we have to be obedient
to God, and that we have to follow conscience. But on the other hand, it flies in the face
of 2,000 years of the notion of religious life; that obedience means obedience to lawful
superiors within the community, and it certainly means the obedience of faith to what the
church believes and teaches. 24

This tension indicates that there is a different understanding between the Vatican and the LCWR
of how the Church is fundamentally ordered. It seems that Sr. Pat Farrell’s model orders the
domain of truth to be interpreted and discerned somewhat equally through the elements of
legitimate Church authority, personal experience, conscience, and direct interpretation of God’s
will. However, the Vatican’s position as articulated by Blair is that “the church is a communion
of faith, and it’s part of our belief that it is hierarchically ordered” 25 with the Magisterium as
having the primacy in terms of authentic authority on truth. As such, that authority must be
obeyed and its teachings must be believed if one is to be considered a loyal and faithful Catholic
– especially in the religious life.
23
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Moving Beyond the Zero-Sum Game
In light of this framework it is easy to categorize the tension between the LCWR and the
Vatican as that of inductive theology versus deductive theology, feminist versus patriarchal,
liberal versus conservative, communal versus monarchical, and many other dichotomies.
However, there is also another possibility when one frames the situation as an opportunity for a
Church-wide examination of conscience and fidelity to truth. In the former framework, there
exists a zero-sum game wherein there must be an obvious “loser” for the “winner” to be
considered righteous or winning out. However, such a model runs contrary to the Church’s own
teaching when it says:
Church, which the Spirit guides in way of all truth and which He unified in communion
and in works of ministry, He both equips and directs with hierarchical and charismatic
gifts and adorns with His fruits. By the power of the Gospel He makes the Church keep
the freshness of youth. Uninterruptedly He renews it and leads it to perfect union with its
Spouse. The Spirit and the Bride both say to Jesus, the Lord, ‘Come!’ 26

To discern that there is possibly an intra-Church loser is to deny the Church’s fundamental belief
that both gifts and charisms are given to all of the Church. Thus, an appropriate way forward is
to discern how the controversy itself is an intra-Church dialogue on truth, revelation, conscience
and obedience - even if its own elements are currently in disagreement. By reflecting upon and
respecting the starting points of both the LCWR and the Vatican, there exists the possibility of a
transformative dialogue that might not only provide a moral understanding to the question of
dissent, but also be an element of a new ecclesial framework.
If the discussion on the LCWR is to move beyond dichotomies, then the third question
must be raised: What is the relationship between truth and obedience in a person’s moral
agency? It is in this question that both Farrell and the Bishops might find a fruitful starting point
to being a dialogue over conscience and its role in discerning how truth and obedience might
26
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direct a person’s actions. While the Vatican approaches the topic of conscience as being
submissive and referential to the objective truth as it is interpreted by the Magisterium, the
LCWR has a more inclusive vision for the discernment over moral issues wherein the teachings
of the Magisterium are brought into dialectical play with individual conscience as it is informed
by human experience. The implications of the LCWR’s vision might seem threatening to the
Vatican because such a dialectic would inevitably result in shifts in the teaching tradition of the
Church and grant greater authority to individual consciences on moral matters. However, the
LCWR’s vision is one that is shared by many within the Church, especially in the wake of the
Second Vatican Council. While tensions and dissent are not new phenomena in the Church, they
do manifest in a particular way within the LCWR case precisely because of the Church’s ongoing process of discerning how to implement the Council’s proclamation:
the Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel. Thus, in language intelligible to each
generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this present
life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other. We must
therefore recognize and understand the world in which we live, its explanations, its
longings, and its often dramatic characteristics.27

For the LCWR, their situation arises out of the complex question that Richard Gaillardetz
identifies in his book, When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in
Today’s Church: “How does a congregation of women religious discern the signs of the times
and not disturb the status quo in society and the Church?” 28 The reality is that the LCWR cannot
avoid disturbing the status quo and the next chapter teases out the lessons from the Charles
Curran controversy to address how a contemporary reading of the signs of the times can justify
dissent as a moral act of personal conscience.
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Chapter Two: Curran, Dissent, and the Holistic Conscience
While the case of the LCWR is perhaps the latest case of public dissent and Vatican
intervention, it is hardly the first case of public dissent in the history of the Catholic Church.
Charles Curran’s conflict with the Vatican in the 1980’s provides an insightful example of what
public dissent in the modern era looks like and the possible merits of it as a moral action. Again,
there is a tendency is to view this issue as a conflict between the Church hierarchy and an
individual Catholic, however, Curran’s dialogue with then-Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect for the
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith at the time, illustrates something different – a dialogue on
what exactly the relationship is between conscience, Church teaching, and fidelity.
The style and content of Curran’s dissent gives a particular illustration as to what areas of
doctrine he deems to be acceptable for dissent and how precisely dissent should be employed.
His deference to personal conscience as the authorizing element for his dissent as well as his
methodology of dissent point towards a style of dissent which is more concerned with engaging
the Church in dialogue than just being a self-interested, scandal-inducing dissenter as a less
critical observer might perceive.
The letters between Curran and Ratzinger reveal a dispute over the understanding of
conscience, the Church’s teaching authority and the context wherein one who considers himself
faithful could publicly dissent from Roman Catholic teaching. Although the Church does not
agree with him, I argue that Curran’s insights in particular opens the possibility for a new moral
framework that allows for dissent as an act of conscience in accord with core Roman Catholic
teaching and its understanding of living tradition. The very fact that the Church does not
recognize Curran’s position and refuses to maintain active dialogue on the matter is the reason
why Curran’s approach is exceptionally practical for those who find themselves at unable to
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assent to Magisterial teachings. In the same respect, those who assent to the Church’s teaching
might, in the service of ecclesial unity, adopt the Church’s recommendation to dissenters: to
remain open and maintain a spirit of discernment over the questions raised. Ultimately, Curran’s
approach to conscience and dissent is an answer to the question that arises when a faithful
Christian cannot assent to the Magisterium: How can dissenters respond to a Church that either
refuses, or lacks the capacity, to dialogue with them? Curran’s response provides the foundation
for a new framework that is drawn out in the next chapter which is developed particularly from
the works of Robert Vischer in light of the documents of the Church documents, especially
Lumen Gentium, Veritatis Splendor and Donum Veritatis.
Curran’s Dissent
Charles Curran was born into a Catholic family in Rochester, New York in 1934. By the
age of thirteen he had discerned that he was called to be a Catholic priest. Curran studied at the
North American College in Rome and took classes at the Jesuit Gregorian University, where he
was schooled in theology under the likes of Bernard Häring and Josef Fuchs, SJ. He continued
onto his doctoral studies and was ordained a diocesan priest.
In 1965, Curran gave a paper calling for the renewal of moral theology at the Theological
Institute of the National Liturgical Conference. This paper called for a renewal in four areas of
moral theology: 1) a more biblical approach centered around Jesus’ teachings from the Sermon
on the Mount; 2) an emphasis on liturgy as a great “source and school for Christian morality”
wherein “Christians become conscious of who they are and what they are called to be in their
lives;” 29 3) a greater focus on how Christians should live their vocation to holiness and
perfection in all aspects of their daily life, and 4) the recognition that “human nature is more
29
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personal, more historical, and more relational than manualistic natural law theory allows.” 30
These four areas of renewal which Curran calls for would be the foundation for what the Vatican
would later deem dissent on Curran’s part. In a series of publications, Curran argued for change
in the approach to natural law and Church teaching on issues such as sterilization, divorce,
masturbation, homosexuality, and justifying dissent itself from noninfallible moral teachings. 31
As a result, in April, 1967, the Catholic University of America decided not to renew Curran’s
teaching contract because of his stances; however, a strike on behalf of Curran led by the faculty
and students of CUA resulted in the trustees reinstating and promoting Curran. In 1968, Curran
was the face of a statement signed by over six hundred Catholic academics that disagreed with
the condemnation of artificial contraception in Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae vitae. 32 As
Curran became more prolific, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith launched a seven-year
investigation which, in July, 1986, declared Curran to be neither “considered suitable nor eligible
to exercise the function of a Professor of Catholic Theology.” 33
Letters Between Curran and Cardinal Ratzinger
The Vatican’s disciplinary action against Curran took part in two steps: first, a letter from
Cardinal Ratzinger asking Curran to retract the positions he takes in opposition to Church
teachings and second, a letter which deemed Curran unsuitable to teach Catholic theology almost
a year later. In the first letter, Cardinal Ratzinger both identifies the areas of Curran’s dissent and
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gives a response which is indicative of the Church’s stance on dissent in the Roman Catholic
ecclesial context.
Cardinal Ratzinger claims:
Catholic theologians […] do not teach on their own authority but by virtue of the mission
they have received from the Church. In order to guarantee this teaching, the Church
claims the freedom to maintain her own academic institutions in which her doctrine is
reflected upon, taught and interpreted in complete fidelity. This freedom of the Church to
teach her doctrine is in full accord with the students’ corresponding right to know what
that teaching is and have it properly explained to them. This freedom of the Church
likewise implies the right to choose for her theological faculties those and only those
professors who, in complete intellectual honesty and integrity, recognize themselves to be
capable of meeting these requirements. 34

Through this logic, Ratzinger establishes the framework which he believes authorizes him to
discipline Curran as defending the freedom of the institution of the Roman Catholic Church to
communicate authentically its identity as understood in the Vatican’s teachings. It follows that if
the Church maintains its freedom to teach its doctrine, then the Church also maintains its right to
choose only those who can communicate the Church’s teaching with “intellectual honesty and
integrity.” Thus, Ratzinger authorizes this disciplinary action against Curran as an exercise of
institutional freedom of conscience – that is, authentically communicating the very identity of the
Church in the Church’s academic institutions.
Secondly, Cardinal Ratzinger identifies three areas of dissent from the Church’s
teachings on: 1) on the principle of the Church’s teaching on contraception, 2) abortion/
euthanasia, and 3) masturbation, pre-marital intercourse and homosexual acts. After explaining
briefly the Church’s justification for its teachings, Ratzinger states that “all the faithful are bound
to follow the Magisterium according to which these acts are intrinsically immoral.” 35 Not only
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does Ratzinger claim the authority of the “living tradition of the Church, made evident in the
teaching of recent Popes, [and] the documents of the Vatican Council II,” but he binds all the
“faithful” to the Magisterium’s moral teachings found in this “living tradition.”

36

While this

letter is primarily directed towards Curran, it is also meant to be an aggregate statement to all the
faithful who might wish to dissent with the Church’s teachings. Ratzinger closed his letter with
an appeal for Curran to retract his positions on these teachings in order for Curran to continue
teaching as a Catholic theologian – a request which Curran refused to accommodate.
Curran replied to Cardinal Ratzinger with a proposed compromise because he remained
“convinced of the truthfulness of [his] positions at the present time.” 37 Ratzinger flatly declined
this compromise and declared Curran ineligible to teach Catholic theology. In his final letter to
Curran, Ratzinger addresses one last concern of his – one which Curran brought up regarding the
teaching authority of the church and “responsible dissent.” 38 Curran had claimed that since his
dissenting positions “diverge only from the ‘non-infallible’ teaching of the Church, they
constitute ‘responsible’ dissent and should therefore be allowed by the Church.” 39 In response to
this, Ratzinger claims that
one must remember the teaching of the Second Vatican Council which clearly does not
confine the infallible Magisterium purely to matters of faith nor to solemn definitions.
[…] Besides this, the Church does not build its life upon its infallible magisterium alone
but on the teaching of its authentic, ordinary magisterium as well. […] In any case, the
faithful must accept not only the infallible magisterium. They are to give the religious
submission of intellect and will to the teaching which the Supreme Pontiff or the college
of bishops enuntiate on faith or morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium,
even if they do not intend to proclaim it with a definitive act.40
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The letters from Cardinal Ratzinger suggest two main areas for analysis in the Curran
case on the topic of dissent: conscience and the teaching authority of the Magisterium. In
Ratzinger’s arguments, it is clear that he takes the traditional stance of defending the
Magisterium’s ultimate authority on doctrinal and moral matters – an authority that resides in
both the infallible teachings of the Church and in the living Tradition of the Church as embodied
by the College of Bishops. It is from this authority that Ratzinger calls for all the faithful to bind
their intellect and will to the Magisterium and its teachings. However, through critically
examining the relational dimension of conscience through the work of Robert Vischer and the
evolution of the Church’s self-understanding as seen in the documents of the Second Vatican
Council, I argue in the next chapter that the relational dimension of conscience calls for an
inversion of Ratzinger’s framework. This argument follows that the faithful are not bound to
submit their intellect and will to the narrowly defined living Tradition of the Church as
understood by Ratzinger, but rather, the teaching authority of the Magisterium is called to serve
and dialogue with the relationally connected consciences of the People of God as the Church
continues to strive towards the perfection it will not attain until “there will come the time of the
restoration of all things. At that time the human race as well as the entire world, which is
intimately related to man and attains to its ends through him, will be perfectly reestablished in
Christ.” 41 But first, it will be useful to identify Curran’s position on the issues of conscience and
magisterial authority as it pertains to dissent.
Curran’s Holistic Understanding of Conscience
In response to Cardinal Ratzinger’s letter in which the CDF officially declared Curran
ineligible to teach Catholic theology, Curran wrote back the following:
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I have always developed my moral theology in the light of accepted Catholic principles.
My positions on the particular issues involved are always carefully nuanced an often in
fundamental agreement with the existing hierarchical teaching. Yes, occasionally I have
dissented from the official teaching on some aspects of specific issues, but this is within a
more general and prevailing context of assent.42

By placing his act of dissent within the larger context of assent to core teaching, Curran explains
his dissent as a form of authentic fidelity. Through understanding Curran’s holistic approach to
conscience with a “relationality-responsibility model” that “sees this call to holiness in light of
the multiple relationships in which we live – with God, our neighbor, the world, and
ourselves,” 43 we can understand how his dissent is actually an exercise of Curran’s holistic
conscience which remains open and disposed to the Word of God.
Curran’s approach to understanding conscience as the coming together of the subject pole
and the object pole of morality is comprised of four major aspects: reason, grace, emotions and
intuitions. 44 While Curran notes that the Catholic moral tradition in both the Thomistic and
manualist traditions understands the objective reality of acts to embrace the moral object, the
end, and the circumstances, he also recognizes that the “affective aspects and the emotions are
important parts of Christian and human existence and also play a significant role in the judgment
of conscience.” 45 These affective aspects are the four mentioned earlier and are shaped by the
“community relationships [that] affect the person as subject.” 46 This signals that while Curran
acknowledges that there is an objective moral truth to be discerned with conscience, there is also
the subjective element that must be seriously considered as the Church embraces modernity’s

42

Curran, Charles. “Response of Charles E. Curran, August 20, 1986.” Moral Theology No. 6:
Dissent in the Church. (ed. By Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, S.J.), 365.
43
Curran, Charles. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition.” Conscience:
Readings in Moral Theology No. 14. (Paulist Press: New York, 2004. Edited by Charles Curran),
14.
44
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 14.
45
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 14.
46
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 14.
25

turn to the subject. Each of the four aspects reflects the implications of acknowledging this turn
to the subject.
The first two aspects, reason and grace, are employed by conscience in at least three
different ways: a discursive deductive way, a connatural way, and a discerning and prudential
way. 47 The common factor in each of the three methods is the mediation of reason and grace.
Simultaneously, as the discourse between grace and reason is mediated in the person, Curran
acknowledges “the role of the Holy Spirit in guiding Christian choices. Liturgical and private
prayer are ways to ask the Holy Spirit to enlighten our hearts and minds.” 48 Thus, spirituality has
a very important part in the mediation of grace and reason as well.
The third and fourth elements of Curran’s holistic understanding of conscience are
emotions and intuition. The emotions that are usually associated with human experiences are not
impurities that are to be sifted out in the discernment of conscience, but rather Curran
“recognizes the affective dimension and opposes any simplistic reduction of conscience only to
the cognitive.” 49 Human aversion to visual depictions of grotesque violence, the appeal of
dramatic narratives, and sentimental movements to beautiful art are all examples of affective
responses of the human person to his/ her experiences which shape his/ her existence. Lastly,
intuition is understood as the “dimension of the person and even a part of the mind that is
unavailable to our reflect consciousness.”
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Newman’s illative sense, intuition is that feeling or hunch that is often difficult to articulate or
rationalize. Curran states that “intuitions can come from many different sources, including grace,

47

Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 16.
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 16.
49
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 16.
50
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 17.
48

26

human nature, and our affective selves.” 51 Nonetheless, these hunches often bear great weight in
the discernment of conscience and cannot be strictly translated into cognitive terms.
With this holistic understanding of conscience, one can surmise how Curran dissents with
Catholic teaching on several issues as the human dimensions of each issue are infinitely varied.
The balance between the subjective and objective poles of moral discernment that Curran seeks
is the ground on which Curran justifies his own dissent against the Magisterium. While he does
not explicitly frame his controversy with the Vatican as such, I argue that the tension between
Curran and the Magisterium is a result of the affective and subjective elements of human
experience meeting the objective pole of the Magisterium’s proclaimed doctrines and tradition.
Should the Church develop a holistic conscience as one Body, then the Magisterium has the
relational responsibility to discern openly the affective elements of the faithful’s lived
experiences and the faithful have the relational responsibility of being the agents of mediation
where reason, grace, emotions and intuition are guided by the Holy Spirit in discourse with the
objective pole of the Magisterium.
By seriously considering Curran’s holistic approach to conscience, the way one might
understand the objective moral order shifts such that intrinsic moral values traditionally assigned
to moral actions them are either brought into question or subject to greater nuance. Chapter three
deals with this implication as Robert Vischer provides the key for applying Curran’s insights in a
Roman Catholic context.
Curran on Dissent in the Church
As far as dissent itself, Curran lists three sets of justifications for dissent and also cites
three norms of licit dissent noted by the United States’ Bishops laid out in their 1968 pastoral
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letter, Human Life in Our Day. It is in the context of these justifications and norms of licit dissent
that Curran understands his own case of dissent as an act that remains faithful to the Roman
Catholic Church and its living tradition.
The three sets of reasons for justifying dissent that Curran describes are historical
reasons, ecclesiological reasons, and reasons from moral theology. The historical reasons pertain
to the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on the “religious obsequium of intellect and will,
which is owed to authoritative noninfallible teaching.” 52 On this matter, Curran states that
obsequium was originally limited to describing the response to definitive Church teaching of
revelation, but has been expanded to issues that are not definitive nor based on revelation. 53
Thus, obsequium is meant to be understood as granting a presumption in favor of the Church’s
teaching and calling for an honest attempt to assent to the proposed teaching. However, should
the honest attempt result in the inability of the individual to assent, then Curran argues for the
possible legitimacy of dissent from noninfallible teaching.
Secondly, the ecclesiological reasons for justifying dissent rests mainly in the
“recognition that the teaching function of the Church is broader than the hierarchical teaching
function. The primary teacher in the Church is the Holy Spirit.” 54 This ecclesiological reason
points to the notion of the sensum fidelium in Catholic theology. Curran argues that an
“ecclesiology of communion now recognizes the important role of reception of Church teaching
by the whole Church. Such communion ecclesiology sees a two-way street between the
hierarchical teaching office and all the people of God.” 55
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Lastly, Curran appeals to the very nature of moral theology to justify the possibility of
dissent. He states that in moral theology, “the greater the specificity and complexity, the less
certitude one can have about a specific norm. […] Conflict situations, by their very nature, are
very complex, and it is hard to imagine that one proposed solution can claim absolute
certitude.” 56 Therefore, as moral issues become more complex and specific, Curran argues that a
blanket approach to all doctrinal and moral matters becomes less legitimate. This is because in
Catholic moral theology there is a notion of an “intrinsic morality – something is commanded
because it is good. The will of the legislator or teacher does not make something good. Rather
the teacher or legislator has to conform to the good as discovered through human reason.” 57
Through the holistic model of conscience and the incorporation of its affective aspects, Curran
believes that one can dissent from noninfallible teachings if one discovers “the good” in a
specific situation outside the bounds of a blanket moral teaching of the Church.
In regards to public dissent, Curran cited the letter from the U.S. Bishops in 1968 that
explicitly stated:
the expression of theological dissent from the magisterium is in order only if the reasons
are serious and well-founded, if the manner of the dissent does not question or impugn
the teaching authority of the Church and is such as not to give scandal.58

It is Curran’s belief that his public dissent in response to the encyclical, Humanae Vitae, fits that
description aptly. Should these conditions given by the US Bishops be met, Curran lists the many
forms of public dissent an individual theologian can take: writing in a theological journal,
publications, being quoted in the media, etc. Organized public dissent involving groups of
theologians, such as the case of Curran’s letter which garnered over six-hundred signatures, is
also a valid form of dissent according to Curran.
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Conclusion
By looking at the Curran case and understanding the theological foundations with which
Curran understands conscience and dissent, one can see how Curran views dissent as a positive
force in the Church and a valid exercise of a holistic conscience. While he understands the
Vatican’s formal denunciation of his specific case of dissent, Curran argues that his dissent is
theologically grounded in the living tradition of the Church, especially in the Church’s
acceptance of modernity’s turn to the subject. He believes that if the Church is to take the
subjective approach to theological anthropology, then it must move away from a strictly
objective approach to moral theology and take into account the affective aspects of the subjective
pole. Nevertheless, should the Church not make that move, Curran asserts the legitimacy of
dissent for those who cannot honestly and authentically assent to noninfallible Church teachings.
It is precisely these insights that can shed light unto today’s current tension between the LCWR
and the Vatican so as to not repeat the painful circumstances of Curran’s case, but rather bring
the Church into a more full communion with respect for the subjective pole of the faithful’s
consciences.
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Chapter Three: Responsible Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context
In the first chapter, I explored the issues being raised by the current controversy between
the LCWR and the Vatican. A look at the current dispute raised questions about how to approach
a conflict between the hierarchy of the Church and its members. Too often these situations are
viewed with a binary lens with a clear person who is right and another who is wrong. However, I
called for a new understanding that moves past that and reaches for a more constructive approach
to the issue of dissent.
In the second chapter, I deconstructed the case of Charles Curran, a Catholic priest who
was deemed unfit by the Vatican to teach Catholic theology because of his dissenting views of
several moral issues. Curran, however, refuses to stop teaching theology: he teaches at a
Methodist university, but still considers himself to be a faithful Catholic. He believes that his
dissent is justified and will one day be redeemed as an act which improved the Church’s
understanding of moral theology.
By bringing the insights from the Curran case into the present issue with the LCWR, a
renewed understanding of dissent can be developed which assists not just the LCWR as
dissenters, but also helps the Church as it strives to overcome the tension between defending its
doctrinal integrity and maintaining a sense of communion with those on the margins of the
Church’s moral scope. The key to such a synthesis is the relational dimension of conscience as
articulated by Robert Vischer in his book, Conscience and the Common Good. Understood in the
context of a post-Vatican II ecclesiology, Vischer’s work sheds new light on how understanding
the relational dimension of conscience can allow for a plurality of consciences without falling
into the pitfalls of a zero-sum game which determines one conscience to be correct and the other
invalid.
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Common Themes: The LCWR and Curran
Before addressing Vischer’s approach to conscience, it is worth noting the common
themes between the LCWR case and Curran’s case. Given the analyses of the previous two
chapters, there are five common elements between the LCWR and Curran cases: 1) the dispute
occurs over divergent perspectives on the moral landscape as a result of differing approaches to
deep theological questions, 2) the dissenting parties appeal to the weight of human experience, 3)
rather than rupture their relationship with the hierarchical Church, the dissenting parties consider
themselves faithful Catholics, and 4) as faithful Catholics, the dissenting parties call for an open
dialogue with the hopes of a renewed understanding of the disputed moral issue(s).
Morality on the Margins
The first commonality between the LCWR and the Curran cases deal with the nature of
dissent. Both the LCWR and Curran understand their conflicts as being clashes over differences
with the hierarchical Church over systematic understanding of Catholic teaching that manifests
itself in instances of moral crises. Often times these crises are unique cases outside of the norm
of Catholic doctrinal teachings. For instance, Farrell’s statement that “women religious stand in
very close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult situations in
their lives” 59 as the justification for the LCWR calling for “the teaching and interpretation of the
faith […] to be reformulated, rethought, in the light of the world we live in and new questions,
new realities as they arise” 60 is an indicator of the weight with which the LCWR measures the
element of human experience in moral decision-making. Their dispute does not seem to be an
attempt to completely deconstruct dogmatic claims which remain at the core of Catholic
teaching, but rather the LCWR finds room for renewed understanding of deep theological
59
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questions in light of contemporary human experience. This attempt at renewal places the LCWR
at odds with the Vatican over how to approach the moral dilemmas that the faithful often find
themselves in. While the hierarchical Church tends to lean towards a deontological method of
moral decision-making, 61 the LCWR and Curran tend towards a responsibility model wherein
“[m]oral persons are seen as ones who are acted upon and then must respond in accordance with
their interpretation of what is happening to them. In this model, the right thing to do is properly
harmonious with the full relational context.” 62
Given this understanding of the conflict, Curran articulates what he calls a “relationalityresponsibility model” that approaches the “call to holiness in light of the multiple relationships in
which we live – with god, our neighbor, the world, and ourselves.” 63 By explicitly linking the
role of relationships in a moral agent’s life with his/ her responsibility as a moral agent, a
connection between a moral agent’s circumstances with his/ her moral responsibility in any
given situation is more clearly demarcated in the relationality-responsibility model than the
deontological approach of the Roman Catholic Church to moral matters. This becomes especially
explicit in instances of developing moral ambiguities such as homosexuality and contraception as
the sciences continue to gather ever-more current anthropological data. As such, both Curran and
the LCWR are both pushing the Roman Catholic Church to acknowledge the individual
uniqueness of varied moral crises which opens up the possibility for varied moral responses to
these situations.
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The Affective Element of Conscience
Both Curran and the LCWR believe themselves to agree on the foundational dogmatic
truths upon which the Roman Catholic Church is founded upon, and they view their dispute as
not being over what is understood to be the objective good, but rather the disagreement is over
the subjective pole (to use Curran’s terms) which functions as the differing variable in moral
assessments. Curran discussed this dimension of the holistic conscience as he emphasized
emotions and intuition as being as important to the discerning conscience as reason and grace. In
the same manner, the LCWR claims a unique insight into moral matters because of the women
religious’ “close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult
situations in their lives.” 64 Sr. Pat Farrell does not deem this to be coincidental, but rather, she
claims that this unique proximity to these people is the women religious’ “gift to the church.”65
By particularly highlight the “painful, difficult” elements of the marginalized peoples’ situations,
she especially appeals to what Curran calls the affective elements of a holistic conscience.
It is important to note that both the LCWR’s proximity to those on the margins and
Curran’s articulation of a holistic conscience are placed within a larger historical and theological
context in the Catholic Church. The Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes, calls for the Church
to read the signs of the times and “recognize and understand the world in which we live, its
explanations, its longings, and its often dramatic characteristics.” 66 This call from the Second
Vatican Council, combined with the Church’s breadth of Catholic Social Teaching and Pope
Paul VI’s decree, Perfectae Caritatis, calling for the adaptation and renewal of religious life, has
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led the LCWR to understand their mission to be present among, and view with charity, the
marginalized wherever they may be. Pope Paul VI stated:
Institutes should see to it that their members have a proper understanding of people, of
the contemporary situation and of the needs of the church, this to the end that, evaluating
the contemporary world wisely in the light of faith, and fired with apostolic zeal, they
may be more helpful to people.67

Since the Second Vatican Council, the hierarchy and several intra-Church faithful have found
themselves at odds over what this call to read the signs of the times means for moral praxis and
ecclesial authority.
Dissent as Fidelity
What is interesting about both the LCWR and Curran cases is that while the Church has
very strictly criticized the perspectives and approaches which constitute the dissenting parties’
self-understanding, the dissenters still claim to be loyal Catholics carrying out their Christian
calling. The fact that Sr. Pat Farrell indicates her dissent as a form of obedience to both “the
voice of God in legitimate church authority” as well as obedience to “the voice of God in the
depths of our own hearts, and in our consciences” 68 signals that this perceived dissent is actually
a form of fidelity. This echoes Curran’s understanding of his own dissent as being “within a
more general and prevailing context of assent.” 69 It is important to note that neither dissenting
party is seeking to appeal to an authority around the hierarchical Church but rather they are
appealing to a higher authority both within and through the Church.
Placing this understanding of dissent as fidelity in context is important because Pope
John Paul II states:
Dissent, in the form of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on in the
media, is opposed to ecclesial communion and to a correct understanding of the
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hierarchical constitution of the People of God. Opposition to the teaching of the Church’s
Pastors cannot be seen as a legitimate expression either of Christian freedom or of the
diversity of the Spirit’s gifts. When this happens, the Church’s Pastors have the duty to
act in conformity with their apostolic mission, insisting that the right of the faithful to
receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must always be respected. 70

This means that there remains a fundamental difference in the ecclesial understanding between
the Vatican and the dissenters that needs to be reconciled. The Vatican illustrates dissent to be
disruptive to the ecclesial communion of the Church while the dissenters view their actions as
necessary for the renewal and strengthening of ecclesial subsidiarity and solidarity within the
Church. Thus, the dissenters call for a venue for dialogue.
Call for Dialogue
Both cases of Curran and the LCWR indicate that since they are appealing to fidelity
towards a higher authority, God, both within and through the Church, then the ultimate goal is to
renew or reform the Church while keeping intact the foundational dogmas it is founded upon.
Both the LCWR and Curran have called for an ecclesial apparatus for dissenters to attempt such
a transformation through open and honest dialogue. Curran specifically cited “the need for just
structures to deal with the inevitable tensions that from time to time will exist between
theologians and pastors” 71 and his message is echoed almost three decades later as Sr. Pat Farrell
proclaims that the LCWR’s “preferred approach would be that we continually seek dialogue and
reconciliation with the hierarchy.” 72 However, it seems that in both cases the attempt at dialogue
is always preempted with an air of suspicion as it only occurs as a result of an “investigation”
from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Such circumstances inhibit such an open
and honest level of communication due to the power differential in the hierarchical relationship
as well as the hermeneutic of suspicion with which the hierarchy begins any dialogue on such
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matters. The Church’s position is not surprising given Pope John Paul II’s statement on dissent
quoted above. In its hierarchy of priorities, the Church takes the stance that the “right of the
people to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity” trumps any claim of legitimate
dissent as an expression either of Christian freedom or diversity of the Spirit’s gifts. 73 The
Church understands this responsibility to be its primary concern as stated in Lumen Gentium:
And this infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed
in defining doctrine of faith and morals, extends as far as the deposit of Revelation
extends, which must be religiously guarded and faithfully expounded. […]To these
definitions the assent of the Church can never be wanting, on account of the activity of
that same Holy Spirit, by which the whole flock of Christ is preserved and progresses in
unity of faith […]The Roman Pontiff and the bishops, in view of their office and the
importance of the matter, by fitting means diligently strive to inquire properly into that
revelation and to give apt expression to its contents; but a new public revelation they do
not accept as pertaining to the divine deposit of faith. 74

According to the Church, the Magisterium still bears the responsibility to properly inquire into
revelation and “give apt expression to its contents,” but it does not allow for new public
revelation to be accepted as the divine deposit of faith since the Church has already received the
fullness of God’s revelation. Thus, even the diversity of the Spirit’s gifts cannot provide new
revelation but only contribute to giving “apt expression” to the revelation the Church has already
received. This distinction excludes the possibility of dissent that, from the Church’s perspective,
ruptures or refutes revelation as interpreted by the Magisterium, the guardian of revelation by
Christ’s will.
Given the four common elements, the two prevailing themes of these elements are: 1) the
relationship of truth and subjectivity in a moral agent’s conscience and 2) the role of the
Magisterium in mediating and engaging the plurality of consciences as the teaching office of a
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pilgrim Church. It is within the context of these two themes that Vischer provides profound
insight.
The Relational Dimension of Conscience
Robert Vischer – the Dean of the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis
who explores the intersection of law, religion, and public policy – attempts to dissect the legal
understandings of conscience in the United States and their practical implications. In his
analysis, he is careful to avoid an over-individualization of conscience as well as a radically
communitarian approach to conscience which conflates uniformity with community. Vischer
intimately links conscience with a person’s very being by stating that a “fully integrated life is
not possible unless the dictates of conscience are reflected in action.” 75 As such, conscience is
understood to be the mode through which a person’s very being is expressed and actualized in a
self-transcending action. However, it is not merely an individualized expression since
“conscience embodies our social nature […] Because conscience is rooted in sources external to
the person, the dictates of conscience call the person outside of herself even while providing a
moral center for her own deeply personal values and priorities.” 76 Therefore, for the hierarchical
Church to demand full assent of its members and require dissenters to conform blindly to
Catholic teaching, the Church is not just requesting obedience but rather demanding a denial of a
person’s integral development in the exercise conscience. It also elevates a person’s relationship
with a hierarchical order above what might be more proximate relationships central to the
person’s very existence (sibling, lover, parent, etc.) and even the person’s direct relationship with
God.
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Another important aspect of Vischer’s understanding of conscience is that it is not a static
and internally isolated moral compass that solely dictates objective moral truths. Vischer argues
that conscience “is a never-ending dialogue with the will, and conscience’s dictates are in play
before, during, and after the moment of choice.” 77 This organic understanding of conscience is
important for understanding Curran’s contention that the convergence of the subjective and
objective poles within conscience can result in different moral responses. Out of this organic
model of conscience, and building off of Stanley Hauerwas’ portrayal of “moral truth as a story
to live out,” Vischer claims that “we cannot separate our moral convictions from who we are,
and we cannot separate who we are from our story.” 78 However, if one’s moral life is played out
as a narrative, then one must acknowledge that one’s moral life is intrinsically relational because
“life narratives, no matter how unique, rarely unfold in isolation.” 79 Therefore, as the Catholic
comes to actualize his or her life narrative as a Roman Catholic, then he or she cannot deny the
relational impact that the Church has had on his or her conscience. Consequently, this selftranscendence requires a dialogical relationship between the Church and the Catholic that grows
in the process of discerning moral truths and ethical decision-making. This dialogue inevitably
makes dissent an essential part of that organic relationship as the dictates of one’s conscience
enters a constant state of play during the development of one’s life narrative.
While the Church acknowledges the judgment of conscience to be an “interior dialogue
of man with himself,” it also states that it is also a “dialogue of man with God” about what the
objective moral obligation is in a particular instance. 80 In regards to this dialogical discernment,
Pope John Paul II states that “in the case of the correct conscience, it is a question of the
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objective truth received by man; in the case of the erroneous conscience, it is a question of what
man, mistakenly, subjectively considers to be true.” 81 Obviously, the Church places great weight
upon the moral objectivity of a given act. However, how does one determine what that moral
objectivity is? Pope John Paul II claims that “Christians have a great help for the formation of
conscience in the Church and her Magisterium.” 82 He claims that the “authority of the Church
[to teach the truth by the will of Christ], when she pronounces on moral questions, in no way
undermines the freedom of conscience of Christians” because freedom of conscience is “always
and only freedom ‘in’ the truth.” 83 By claiming the Church to be the teacher of the truth and
defining the parameters for the freedom of conscience as residing only within the truth, Pope
John Paul II creates a de facto model wherein to form properly one’s conscience in freedom, then
the Christian must do so in and through the Church. In this manner, Pope John Paul II claims that
the “Church puts herself always and only at the service of conscience, helping it to avoid being
tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine proposed by human deceit.” 84
However, the problem with this absolutist argument arises when one seriously considers
the Church’s self-understanding in Lumen Gentium when the Council affirms the Church’s
pilgrim status which “will attain its full perfection only in the glory of heaven.” 85 Therefore, as a
pilgrim Church, the Magisterium cannot uphold with certitude a completely static moral order
that “transcends all particular narratives,” 86 as Vischer would put it. In light of its perpetual
imperfection, the Church would do well to heed Vischer’s call to “acknowledge the diversity of
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moral truths without precluding the very possibility that moral truth can be discerned” 87 and not
merely “received” as Pope John Paul II claims it to be.
The narrative of the pilgrim Church’s eschatological journey inevitably interacts and
dialogues with the individual narratives of the people of God so intimately that Vischer can
claim “the process of discernment is necessarily a context-specific one.” 88 This validates
Curran’s holistic approach to conscience which does not undermine the objective pole of moral
truth but takes into serious consideration the affective/ subjective pole of human experience as it
unfolds in a person’s life narrative. This also validates the LCWR’s understanding of its unique
position on the margins with people experiencing painful, difficult situations as its gift to the
Church because it brings to light the unacknowledged narratives of Christians who have been
living in the periphery of objective morality. In this light, dissent is not an immoral or unfaithful
objection to a static moral truth, but it is a conscientious act of a discerning Christian hoping to
dialogue with a pilgrim Church as it continues to strive towards perfection. The question remains
then: if the Church is not to dictate “correct consciences” based solely on objective moral truths,
then how can the Church be at the service of conscience?
The Church’s Role in the Service of Conscience
In Vischer’s legal analysis, he claims that the best role the state can take on in order to
allow for what he calls a “moral marketplace” to thrive for the common good is four-fold: 1)
“state actors must appreciate that the human person is inherently social,” 2) “in light of the
‘bottom up’ nature of moral discourse underlying the common good, the state must permit
individuals and the groups to which they belong broad discretion to pursue moral identities that
are not favored by the majority or contemplated by the premises of liberalism. The marketplace
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of moral claims is essential to the common good,” 3) the state’s commitment to equality need not
preclude the partiality that invariably arises in meaningful human relationships […] the state
should focus its equality initiatives on ensuring access to goods and services,” and 4) “embracing
moral pluralism does not preclude the building of social consensus on issues of common
importance.” 89 This model of state intervention can analogously inform the way in which the
Church might understand its role in serving the consciences of the faithful.
There are, indeed, some limitations on applying Vischer’s approach of creating a moral
marketplace onto the Church. First, Vischer’s state-as-market-actor approach relies on a
presumption “about the dynamic and chronically incomplete character of understanding and the
value of intellectual contest and innovation.” 90 For the Church to claim a “chronically
incomplete character of understanding” would be counter to its conviction that it contains the
fullness of the deposit of revelation. Taken to an extreme, this presumption compromises the
moral authority of the Church as an institution the objective nature of the moral order becomes
unreliable for discernment. Secondly, transposing Vischer’s model for the state onto the Church
is problematized when Vischer claims the following about the state:
this intermediate space [between the individual and the state] is where the moral
marketplace does its work, and much of that work is aimed at constructing bulwarks
against the encroachments of the state. That this work may not result in a broader
discernment of truth is immaterial because the state’s elevation of a single contested
conception of individual autonomy also has little relation to truth.91

Be describing the moral marketplace’s lack of a broader discernment of truth as immaterial not
only runs contrary to the Church’s service of conscience but also defeats the purpose of the
dissenters’ call for dialogue. An ecclesial moral marketplace does call for a broader discernment
of truth so that the Church might more aptly express the revelation it has received according to
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the signs of the times. Regulating these weaknesses of transposing Vischer’s state-as-marketactor approach would mean making the primary goal of the Church/state analogy the goal
Vischer states in his engagement on conscience and associations:
The association must be ensured access to the public forum on an equal basis with other
speakers; the dissenting individual must be assured that the access is not exclusive to any
particular association; and the state must be permitted to identify and maintain the crucial
distinction between access and promotion.” 92

By maintaining the distinction between access and promotion, the Church gives the flexibility for
dissenters, and associations like the LCWR, to have access to formal discourse without
necessarily promoting their views as official doctrinal teaching. This allows for the Church to
still claim its teaching authority while creating the space for dissenters to dialogue in a moral
marketplace and maintaining the ecclesial unity Pope John Paul II deemed in jeopardy with the
presence of dissent.
While understanding that the Magisterium has a special interest in preserving the
authentic teaching of the faith, it also bears the responsibility of serving authentically the holistic
consciences of the people of God. Acknowledging both the relational dimension of conscience
and the validity of the subjective pole in conscience formation would accomplish the first two
elements respectively. In regards to the third aspect, engaging in dialogue with dissenters does
not preclude the Church from exercising its teaching authority but prudential restraint on the part
of the Magisterium would accomplish much towards ensuring an environment of open and
honest dialogue. Giving theologians the space of academic freedom, as Curran encouraged,
would help to accomplish this goal of guiding a fruitful discussion without being overly
repressive of progressive thought. Lastly, acknowledging that the relational dimension of
conscience does not reduce the judgment of conscience to “moral relativism” as the Church has
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long feared is the first step towards a communitarian approach to conscience mediation between
the Church and the faithful.
Taking the step beyond fear of “moral relativism” is one which the Church has yet to
take. The combination of consolidating authentic interpretation with the Magisterium alone and
the strictly deontological approach to the development of conscience does not allow for, and is in
denial of, the current reality of Catholics in the present time. While a manualistic approach may
have served the faithful during the classical era, it does little to serve the consciences of those
whose life narratives are also being shaped by developments in anthropological understandings
of the post-modern era. Thus, an acknowledgment of a “moral marketplace” in a Roman Catholic
context might best be understood as taking seriously the notion of sensus fidelium wherein the
Holy Spirit is believed to distribute “his gifts to everyone according as He wills, He distributes
special graces among the faithful of every rank. By these gifts He makes them fit and ready to
undertake the various tasks and offices which contribute toward the renewal and building up of
the Church.” 93 By sustaining an arena for open dialogue, the Church allows for the gifts allotted
to all the faithful to be expressed as the testimony of their life narratives while bearing the fruit
of a moral marketplace. Vischer claims that “the moral marketplace serves a ‘checking’ function
on state efforts to instill conformity in matters governed by contested moral norms.” 94 Thus, an
ecclesial apparatus that allows for dissent and academic freedom would be this “checking
function” within the hierarchical Church and a venue for a dialogical convergence of a plurality
of consciences among the people of God.
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A Moral Framework for Dissent in the Roman Catholic Church
Vischer’s ultimate claim is that respect for the relational dimension of conscience and a
thriving moral marketplace are necessary for the “common good.” In order to understand how
dissent as an act of conscience can contribute to this good, it is important to clarify how the
“common good” is understood in the Roman Catholic ecclesial context. Pope John Paul II clearly
addresses what the Church understands to be the common good when he states “to ask about the
good, in fact, ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of goodness […] God, who
alone is goodness, fullness of life, the final end of human activity, and perfect happiness.” 95 In
light of this definition, the question becomes: How can dissent be a catalyst for turning towards
God?
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith makes its position very clear in its letter
on the ecclesial vocation of theologians, Donum Veritatis, that dissent is a problem and cannot be
justified by an appeal to conscience because “setting up a supreme magisterium of conscience in
opposition to the magisterium of the Church means adopting a principle of free examination
incompatible with the economy of Revelation and its transmission in the Church.” 96 The problem
with this articulation is two-fold. First, it disregards the relational dimension of conscience by
making the theologian’s relationship with the Magisterium the supreme relationship with
primacy over more proximate relationships to the person. Secondly, it misunderstands dissent as
being in opposition to the Church while a holistic conscience and communitarian approach to
conscience sees this form of dissent as a dialogue with the Church.
In regards to doctrinal teachings, the CDF states that should a theologian not find himself
or herself able, after an honest and sincere attempt, to assent to a certain doctrinal teaching, then
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“the theologian has the duty to make known to the Magisterial authorities the problems raised by
the teaching in itself, in the arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner in which it is
presented. He [or she] should do this in an evangelical spirit and with a profound desire to
resolve the difficulties.” 97 However, the theologian “should avoid turning to the ‘mass media’”
and “nevertheless has the duty to remain open to a deeper examination of the question.” 98 This is
precisely the spirit with which Curran and the LCWR appeal towards in legitimizing their
dissenting actions. However, the problem arises when the magisterial authorities either enter the
dialogue with a hermeneutic of suspicion or effectively limit the dialogue to a monologue
wherein the magisterial authority does not recognize its own duty to “remain open to a deeper
examination of the question.” In such an instance, the Curran case has given the theological
insights to dissent responsibly and the LCWR has actually provided a legitimate framework that
embodies lessons from the Curran case in Sr. Pat Farrell’s presidential address, “Navigating the
Shifts.”
The Curran case not only provides the theological foundation for Sr. Pat Farrell’s
address, but also provides key conditions for legitimate dissent. With Curran’s understanding of
conscience understood to be “far from positing relativism or subjectivism, this approach affirms
a radical identity between authentic subjectivity and objectivity.” 99 This communicates the selftranscendence of conscience as articulated by Vischer. Therefore, for dissent to be legitimately
understood as a valid act of conscience, it must be a faithful call for dialogue over non-infallible
teaching that strikes at the core of one’s personhood, namely freedom as fully expressed in that
person’s intersubjective life narrative. Should that dialogue not take place, Curran justifies public

97

Donum Veritatis, 30.
Donum Veritatis, 30-31.
99
Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition”, 19.
98

46

dissent as not just as a moral option, but as a duty of conscience for the greater good of the
Church.
In her address, Sr. Pat Farrell lists six ways with which the LCWR might navigate the
present times: contemplation, with a prophetic voice, in solidarity with the marginalized, in
community, non-violently and with joyful hope. I argue that these six strategies compose an
effective and moral framework for authentic dissent in the Church today.
Contemplation
Sr. Pat Farrell asks: “How else can we go forward except from a place of deep prayer?
Our vocations, our lives, begin and end in the desire for God. We have a lifetime of being lured
into union with divine Mystery. That Presence is our truest home.” 100 This sincere contemplation
acknowledges and ensures the guidance of the Spirit and the authentic strife for the common
good that is a turning towards God who is the fullness of all goodness.
With a Prophetic Voice
Farrell states that the call of Vatican II “urged us to respond to the signs of our times” and
that “prophecy is both God’s gift as well as the product of rigorous asceticism. Our rootedness in
God needs to be deep enough and our read on reality clear enough for us to be a voice of
conscience.” 101 This call for a prophetic voice is one that must be tempered with informed
reason. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the prophetic dissenter to be masters in the schools
of theology and the social sciences in order to properly read the “signs of our times.” Farrell is
clear not to conflate prophecy with arrogance. She claims that a prophetic response “would be
humble, but not submissive; rooted in a solid sense of ourselves, but not self-righteous; truthful,
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but gentle and absolutely fearless. It would ask probing questions.” In this manner a dissenter
can fulfill his or her call to share “also in Christ’s prophetic office.” 102
Solidarity with the Marginalized
Farrell boldly claims that “we cannot live prophetically without proximity to those who
are vulnerable and marginalized.” 103 Just be fulfilling the pre-condition of dissenting over noninfallible teaching is not alone for the authentic dissenter. He or she must also be willing to live
in solidarity with the marginalized as an extension of conscience’s self-transcendence. This also
takes seriously the implications of the sensus fidelium by living in solidarity with those on the
margins of the hierarchy’s moral framework.
In Community
Farrell declares of the LCWR that “we have learned a lot about creating community from
diversity, and about celebrating differences. We have come to trust divergent opinions as
powerful pathways to greater clarity. Our commitment to community compels us to do that, as
together we seek the common good.” 104 This characteristic is essential to the common good of
the Church because it is precisely this element that distinguishes a responsible dissenter from a
disenfranchised Christian who turns unto himself. A characteristic of self-transcending
conscience is that continual giving of self towards God and not a turning into oneself away from
one’s relationships.
Non-violent
Non-violence does not just refer to physical violence, but also to “resisting rather than
colluding with abusive power […] It refuses to shame, blame, threaten or demonize. In fact, non102
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violence requires that we befriend our own darkness and brokenness rather than projecting it
onto another. […] It refuses to accept ultimatums and dead-end definitions without imaginative
attempts to reframe them.” 105 It is this approach that marks the transformative power of dissent
as dialogue. Curran exemplified this when he stated in his letter to Ratzinger that “I am
conscious of my own limitations and my own failures. I am aware of the consequences of what is
involved […] I remain a loyal and committed Roman Catholic. I pray daily that I might continue
to love and serve the Church without bitterness and anger. […] I believe these are all for the
good of the Roman Catholic Church – my Church.” 106
Living in Joyful Hope
Farrell concluded her remarks by stating “joyful hope is the hallmark of genuine
discipleship […] Hope makes us attentive to signs of the inbreaking of the Reign of God.” 107
This hope corresponds with the eschatological nature of the pilgrim Church. Recognizing the
imperfection of the present Church, joyful hope allows the dissenter to move forward with
charity and perseverance in the work of achieving the common good. It is in this spirit that the
dissenter echoes the words of the CDF when it stated “that if the truth really is at stake, it will
ultimately prevail.” 108 It is this common spirit of joyful hope that opens the possibility for the
Spirit to transform such tension into a moment of grace for the Church and the people of God.
Conclusion
Given the present conflict between the LCWR and the Vatican hierarchy, it serves the
discerning faithful best to view this conflict in light of the relational dimension of conscience.
Through this lens, one can observe how the LCWR’s dissent is not a form of malicious rebellion
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against Church hierarchy. Instead, one observes how the LCWR is exercising responsible dissent
as an act of conscience in relationship with the Church. The LCWR’s actions are a call for open
and honest dialogue. It would do well for the Magisterium to respond with the same openness
and good-will as it expects of its theologians.
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Conclusion
In the first chapter I explored the deeper questions being raised from the present LCWR
case. Although at surface level, the temptation is to view these types of conflicts with a binary
lens of right and wrong, it neither serves the Church nor the people of God to diminish the
richness of the present dynamic. What actually is occurring is a case of two divergent claims
over how truth manifests itself in the practical dimensions of people’s lives. The dispute is over
the pragmatic application of truth in the discernment of conscience and what its implications are
for the truth itself. Thus, the question became an investigation into methodology and theological
anthropology: What exactly is the relationship between truth and reason in the discernment of
conscience? The second question stems out of the first question: What exactly is the Church’s
role in mediating this discernment process?
The second chapter provided greater insight as to how one might answer such questions
in the light of a holistic approach to conscience. Using the case study of Charles Curran’s
controversy with the Vatican, I formulated that dissent can be a positive force in the larger
dynamic of one’s assent to Church teachings. When one cannot assent to a non-infallible
teaching but accepts the foundational dogmatic truths of the Roman Catholic Church, one can
and must dialogue about the situation as a matter of conscience.
It was discovered in this chapter that the point of departure between Curran and the
hierarchical Church is the formal understanding of conscience and its proper discernment. While
the Church traditionally favors a deontological approach to conscience wherein objective truths
of received Gospel teachings are interpreted solely by the Magisterium and require the assent of
the faithful, more progressive thinkers who take seriously modernity’s turn to the subject place
greater weight on the subjective dimension of conscience. Curran claims that a holistic
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conscience is a convergence of the subjective and objective poles within the human person.
Under this model, the affective dimensions of the subjective pole – reason, grace, emotions, and
intuition – signal an interdependent characteristic of conscience that is a composition of one’s
human experiences.
The third chapter, after deconstructing both the LCWR case and the Curran case,
attempted to construct a moral framework for understanding dissent as a legitimate act of
conscience in a Roman Catholic context. This required the use of Vischer’s articulation of
conscience’s relational dimension. Through Vischer’s hermeneutic, conscience is understood as
an ever-dynamic faculty of the human person to discern how one might transcend oneself in light
of one’s life narrative that is shaped through one’s relationships. The implications of such an
understanding are broad and deep, but for the purpose of understanding dissent I focused on how
a context-specific discernment of conscience justifies dissent as an authentic expression of one’s
personhood in relationship with, not in opposition to, the Church.
In this light, the Church maintains a responsibility to acknowledge seriously the
dissenting conscience out of respect for the dignity of the human person expressing her authentic
self. Thus, in the service of conscience, the Church bears the responsibility of neither stifling
conscience nor dictating it with a blanket objective truth without any regard for the
circumstances which define a person’s life narrative. The hierarchical Church can best do this by
modeling itself as a venue for what Vischer calls a “moral marketplace” wherein the sensus
fidelium might have an inclusive invitation to dialogue with the Church. Fears of moral
relativism or challenges to the Church’s teaching authority might be reduced if the Church is
given an avenue to make a distinction between a dissenter’s access to theological discourse and
promotion of doctrinal teaching. In this way, mutual acknowledgment and respect for the
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Church’s teaching authority and the dissenter’s conscience are shared in a dialogical ecclesial
communion.
Given this renewed understanding of conscience and dissent, the LCWR is found to be
righteous in their stated approach found in Farrell’s presidential address. The six-part framework
is a model for all the faithful who, after a sincere attempt to assent to Church teaching, finds
themselves being untrue to their life narratives. In contemplation, with a prophetic voice, through
solidarity with the marginalized, in community, non-violently, and in joyful hope can all
dissenters be true prophetic voices working towards the common good in a pilgrim Church everstriving for that perfection in Christ.
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